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I. INTRODUCTION
Court congestion in the United States has long been a prominent issue 
in the lion’s share of judicial branches at various levels of government.1
However, as America develops into a more litigious society, courts are bu-
 * The author is a J.D. Candidate May 2013, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard 
Broad Law Center.  David earned his Bachelor of Arts in Economics—with a minor in Histo-
ry—from Temple University, College of Arts and Sciences.  Furthermore, David is a Florida 
Supreme Court Approved Arbitrator.  David wishes to thank his family for their support and 
encouragement.  He would also like to thank the staff of Nova Law Review and the faculty of 
the Law Center for their effort and guidance throughout the writing process. 
 1. See S. 2027, 101st Cong. § 2 (1990) (enacted).  Additionally, the author interned with 
Judge Robert W. Lee, a County Court Judge of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit of Florida, in 
Fort Lauderdale, Florida, who regularly expressed concern over the dire state of the judicial 
docket. 
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ried by a deluge of complaints that reach near cataclysmic levels.2  Conges-
tion is the root of enduring legal conflicts3 and hence skyrocketing legal 
fees.4  Fortunately, disputes which cannot be resolved by the parties have 
means of alternative legal resolution.5
Arbitration is a technique of alternative dispute resolution outside the 
standard judicial process, whereby legal disputes—situations requiring a 
binding decision—are taken before neutral third parties, either an arbiter or 
panel of arbitrators, whose decision will be binding upon the parties.6  The 
intent of arbitration is to have a more efficient and simpler, thus cheaper, 
process relative to traditional litigation.7  Arbitration can be either voluntary 
or mandatory.8  Mandatory arbitration can arise from state statute, as well as 
freely be entered via valid contract,9 where parties agree to resolve prospec-
tive confrontations with arbitrative proceedings.10
Generally, arbitration is utilized in commercial transactions both inter-
national and domestic,11 yet nothing limits arbitration use to a specific area of 
law.12  Unfortunately, as arbitration becomes more popular, courts are chal-
 2. Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes:  What We Know and Don’t 
Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 
UCLA L. REV. 4, 7–8 (1983).  While it may be hyperbole to say that courts are prone to suffer 
disaster from a tidal wave of cases being litigated, the increased workload of courts has made 
a seemingly slow bureaucratic process move at a snail’s pace.  See JAMES Q. WILSON,
BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT at x, 317–18 
(1989). 
 3. See Anemona Hartocollis, A Judge Gets Manhattan’s Oldest Divorce Cases Moving,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1997, at B1. 
 4. See The Costs of the Most Expensive Litigation, CARL E. PERSON, http://www. Carl 
person.com/expensive.php (last visited Oct. 28, 2012). 
 5. George H. Friedman, Dispute Resolution Clauses in Insurance Contracts, in THE 
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION INSURANCE ADR MANUAL 102, 103, 110 (1993). 
 6. Arbitration Defined, U.S. ARB. ASS’N, http://usadr.com/arbitration-defined (last vi-
sited Oct. 28, 2012). 
 7. Id.
 8. Id.; see Paul T. Milligan, Who Decides the Arbitrability of Construction Disputes?,
CONSTRUCTION LAW., Spring 2011, at 23, 29. 
 9. FLA. STAT. § 682.02 (2012); Arbitration Defined, supra note 6. 
 10. FLA. STAT. § 682.02; Arbitration Defined, supra note 6. 
 11. See Milligan, supra note 8, at 23 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)); Safina Lakhani, Ca-
reers in International Commercial Arbitration, 1 INT’L COM. ARB. BRIEF 5, 5 (2011); ROBERT 
V. MASSEY, JR., W. VA. UNIV. EXTENSION SERV., HISTORY OF ARBITRATION AND GRIEVANCE 
ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES para. 2 (2003), available at http://www.laborstudies 
andresearch.ext.wvu.edu/r/download/32003. 
 12. What Types of Disputes Can Be Arbitrated?, ARB. FAQ, http://www.arbitrationfaq. 
com/disputesandarbitration.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2012).  Under the common law, no area 
of law was prohibited from using arbitration.  MASSEY, supra note 11, para. 3; What Types of 
Disputes Can Be Arbitrated?, supra.  However, bills that would limit arbitration of family law 
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lenged by the legality of such arrangements.13  Particularly, in Florida, there 
is currently a split among the district courts of appeal regarding the extent of 
applicability of arbitration clauses in contracts between parties regarding tort 
claims.14  In other words, does a broad and general arbitration clause apply to 
a complaint in a tort which may have arisen from a contract but only te-
nuously touches it?  The Supreme Court of Florida recently heard oral argu-
ments in Jackson v. Shakespeare Foundation, Inc. (Jackson II)15 on this exact 
issue.16  The Shakespeare Foundation, a Florida company, and its real estate 
developer complained in a lawsuit that George Jackson and Kerry Jackson, 
along with their real estate company, committed fraud in a property deal be-
tween the parties.17  The complaint alleged the Jacksons misrepresented the 
presence of wetlands on the property.18  The Jacksons argued that the case 
must be dismissed because the sales contracts contained an arbitration provi-
sion.19  Although the trial court agreed, the First District Court of Appeal 
reversed the trial court’s ruling.20  Furthermore, the First District Court of 
Appeal certified that its opinion was in direct conflict with an opinion issued 
in a substantially similar case from the Fifth District Court of Appeal.21
Florida courts have struggled with the application of the Florida Arbi-
tration Code to arbitration provisions in commercial contracts since it was 
enacted by the Florida Legislature in 1957.22  Unfortunately, the assembly of 
matters have recently been proposed in Florida.  Fla. CS for SB 963 (2012) (Dispute Resolu-
tion), available at http://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2012/0963 (last visited Oct. 28, 2012); 
see also FLA. STAT. § 44.104(14). 
 13. See, e.g., Shakespeare Found., Inc. v. Jackson (Jackson I), 61 So. 3d 1194, 1196 (Fla. 
1st Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 74 So. 3d 1083 (Fla. 2011).  This argument reached the 
court via an arbitration clause in a boiler-plate Florida contract for the purchase and sale of 
real property.  Id. at 1197.
 14. See id. at 1200–01 (citing Maguire v. King, 917 So. 2d 263, 266–67 (Fla. 5th Dist. 
Ct. App. 2005)).  Compare id. at 1204, with Maguire, 917 So. 2d at 268. 
 15. 74 So. 3d 1083 (Fla. 2011) (unpublished table decision). 
 16. Oral Argument Schedule & Briefs, FLA. SUPREME CT., http://www.floridasupreme 
court.org/pub_info/summaries/oa06-12.shtml (last visited Oct. 28, 2012). 
 17. Respondents’ Answer Brief on the Merits at 1–2, Jackson v. Shakespeare Found., 
Inc., No. SC11-1196 (Fla. Feb. 8, 2012); see also Complaint at 1, Shakespeare Found., Inc. v. 
Jackson, No. 09-1399CA, 2010 WL 8747760 (Fla. 14th Cir. Ct. Jan. 27, 2010). 
 18. Complaint, supra note 17, at 3–4. 
 19. Respondents’ Answer Brief on the Merits, supra note 17, at 2.
 20. Jackson I, 61 So. 3d 1194, 1196 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 74 So. 3d 
1083 (Fla. 2011); Respondents’ Answer Brief on the Merits, supra note 17, at 2.
 21. Jackson I, 61 So. 3d at 1200–01; see also Maguire v. King, 917 So. 2d 263, 268 (Fla. 
5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005). 
 22. See Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 636 (Fla. 1999); Act Effective Oct. 
1, 1957, ch. 57-402, § 24, 1957 Fla. Laws 928, 936 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 57.11 (1957)).  
Common law arbitration existed in Florida before the enactment of the Florida Arbitration 
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Florida lawmakers failed to provide much, if any, guidance to the courts in 
defining how to appropriately find boundaries as to the scope of arbitration 
clauses.23  As a result, it has been left up to the courts to formulate a test that 
can accurately interpret the essence of the law.24  Generally, the courts strug-
gled with whether to interpret the arbitration clauses broadly or narrowly 
because it is unclear if the legislature intended for the alternative dispute 
provisions to be applicable to claims generally or specifically.25
“The size, vitality, and importance of Florida as a center of commercial 
activity and a unique legal jurisdiction explains why a large quantity of dis-
putes over arbitrability26 each year require a Florida Arbitration Code-based 
analysis and occur outside of interstate commerce.”27  Therefore, the follow-
ing discussion regarding arbitration and the complexity of the conceptual 
scope of arbitration agreement provisions is strictly limited to Florida law. 
This article will narrowly focus on the examination of arbitrational is-
sues that arise between contracting parties when they have an agreement with 
a broad arbitration clause and one party wants to sue the other party in tort.  
Particularly, this article reviews the major conflicts among the Florida appel-
late level courts regarding the enforcement of arbitration clauses and the 
analysis of their applicability to civil tort claims.28
Part II of this paper will describe the current state of arbitration in Flor-
ida, including a description of what legal rules apply to arbitration, and how 
arbitration is compelled by the courts of Florida.  Part II will also include a 
Code; however, there was a strong presumption against arbitration except in complex em-
ployment disputes.  See A. Dallas Albritton, Jr., Florida Arbitration Law, 31 FLA. B.J. 121, 
125 (1957). 
 23. See FLA. STAT. § 682.02 (2012) (providing that parties can agree to arbitrate future 
disputes relating to a contract, but failing to define what “relating to” means). 
 24. See Seifert, 750 So. 2d at 636 (citing Terminix Int’l Co. v. Ponzio, 693 So. 2d 104, 
106 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997)). 
 25. See id. at 636–38, 641. 
 26. For purposes of this article, the term arbitrability refers “to the question of whether a 
particular dispute is within the scope of an arbitration provision the parties indisputably agreed 
to, as distinct from the question of whether an arbitration provision is unenforceable because 
of (for example) fraud, unconscionability, or lack of agreement by all parties.”  Certified Coat-
ings of Cal., Inc. v. Shimmick Constr. Co., No. A120531, 2009 WL 311527, at *8 n.8 (Cal. 
Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2009) (citing Bruni v. Didion, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 395, 407 (Ct. App. 2008)).  
For example, Watson v. Duval Cnty. Sch. Bd., 408 So. 2d 1053, 1054 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 
1981), was the first case to use the word “arbitrability” within the main text of a judicial opi-
nion written by a Florida court.  Michael Cavendish, The Concept of Arbitrability Under the 
Florida Arbitration Code, FLA. B.J., Nov. 2008, at 19, 25 n.1. 
 27. Cavendish, supra note 26, at 19. 
 28. Questions in tort are singular—relative to other types of contentions within arbitra-
tion issues—because tort law encompasses both common law duties as well as contractually 
prescribed duties.  See VIVIENNE HARPWOOD, MODERN TORT LAW 1–2 (7th ed. 2009). 
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brief discussion on the history of arbitration in the Sunshine State, illustrated 
by reference to highlights of pertinent jurisprudence on alternative dispute 
resolution. Next, Part III will tackle the judiciary’s biggest issue—
determining the arbitrability of a given dispute.  This issue will be explained 
and examined through the prism of the case sub judice—Shakespeare Foun-
dation, Inc. v. Jackson (Jackson I).29  Part III will discuss the threshold issues 
the court must determine.  It will diagram, with scrutiny, the pros and cons of 
both the petitioners’30 and respondents’31 arguments.  Part IV examines the 
potential fallout from the decision in Jackson I, continuing with a discussion 
of how that decision will shape future arbitration provisions.  Finally, this 
article concludes that the current test under Florida law is unsatisfactory to 
determine arbitrability with consistent results and that the courts in Florida 
should craft a new test based on what they deem to be the most controlling 
factor—the parties’ intent.32
II. CURRENT STATE OF ARBITRATION LAW IN FLORIDA
Otis B. Driftwood:  It’s all right, that’s in every contract.  That’s 
what they call a sanity clause. 
Fiorello:  You can’t fool me!  There ain’t no Sanity Claus!33
Arbitration clauses are almost always utilized in commercial contracts 
or other types of arrangements, which can be catalysts for complex litiga-
tion.34  The right to arbitrate cases within the purview of the Florida Arbitra-
tion Code—similar to the Federal Arbitration Act upon which the Florida 
Statutes are based—generally turns on a “seemingly simple question:  ‘Is this 
 29. 61 So. 3d 1194 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 74 So. 3d 1083 (Fla. 2011). 
 30. See Petitioners’ Initial Brief on the Merits at 5–13, Jackson v. Shakespeare Found., 
Inc., No. SC11-1196 (Fla. Jan. 19, 2012). 
 31. See Respondents’ Answer Brief on the Merits, supra note 17, at 7–28. 
 32. See Cavendish, supra note 26, at 20. 
 33. Memorable Quotes for A Night at the Opera, IMDB, http://www.imdb. com/title 
/tt0026778/quotes (last visited Oct. 28, 2012).  These lines are from a famous scene, known as 
“the contract scene,” where two managers of entertainers are negotiating a contract for per-
formances.  A NIGHT AT THE OPERA (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1935). 
 34. See MASSEY, supra note 11, para. 2. 
In the United States unionized sector, studies have shown that the number of collective bar-
gaining agreements that contain arbitration clauses as a means of dispute resolution (grievance 
arbitration) has been on the rise.  In fact, by 1944 the Bureau of Labor Statistics showed that 
73% of all labor contracts in America contained arbitration clauses and by the early 1980’s that 
figure had grown to 95%.  Today, 98% of all collective bargaining agreements in the United 
States contain arbitration clauses. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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claim arbitrable?’”35  The answer to this question often requires the intricate 
dissection of multifaceted legal rationale, which has the ability to lead to 
unpredictable results.36  A clear understanding of “the concept of arbitrability 
under the Florida Arbitration Code” is a mandatory qualification for adjudi-
cators in contemporary courts to resolve the deft question posed above in one 
of their most hotly litigated subject matters—arbitration concerning tort 
claims.37
Though there are instances in which a particular controversy is within 
the scope of an arbitration agreement between contracting parties, it is also 
quite regular that disputes fall into a grey area of whether or not they are 
within the scope of the arbitration clause.38  In Florida, this is usually called 
into question “in the context of a motion to compel arbitration, when the 
court is required to determine, inter alia, whether” a claim is subject to arbi-
tration.39  When adjudicating the issue of whether a claim falls within the 
scope of an arbitration clause, the court must glean the intent of the contract-
ing parties through careful examination of the language of the agreement.40
Presumably, the question arises most when the quarrel under review is 
whether a civil complaint in tort falls within the defined boundaries of an 
agreement to arbitrate or whether such a claim lies solely within the jurisdic-
tion of the courts.41
The preeminent Florida case devoted to this controversy is Seifert v. 
U.S. Home Corp.,42 where the court held the suitable test to determine if an 
 35. Cavendish, supra note 26, at 24–25. 
 36. Id. at 25. 
 37. Id.
 38. See Milligan, supra note 8, at 23; see generally Joseph L. Daly & Suzanne M. Schel-
ler, Strengthening Arbitration by Facing Its Challenges, 28 QUNNIPIAC L. REV. 67, 67–83 
(2009) (discussing and addressing many issues within arbitration). 
 39. The Scope of Arbitration Clauses in Florida, L. & ARB. OFFS. DONALD T RYCE,
http://floridaarbitrator.net/the_scope_of_arbitration_clauses_in_florida (last visited Oct. 28, 
2012). 
 40. Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 636 (Fla. 1999) (quoting Seaboard Coast 
Line R.R. Co. v. Trailer Train Co., 690 F.2d 1343, 1348 (11th Cir. 1982)) (citing Regency 
Grp., Inc. v. McDaniels, 647 So. 2d 192, 193 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (per curiam)); The 
Scope of Arbitration Clauses in Florida, supra note 39. 
 41. See The Scope of Arbitration Clauses in Florida, supra note 39.  Arbitration provi-
sions must have defined boundaries, even if they are vague, because it is illegal for such pro-
visions to oust the jurisdiction of the courts.  See id.; 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 315 (2012).  
Additionally, “arbitration [agreements and] provisions are contractual in nature [and] con-
struction of such provisions . . . remains a matter of contract interpretation.”  Seifert, 750 So. 
2d at 636 (citing Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 690 F.2d at 1352; R.W. Roberts Constr. Co. 
v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. ex rel. McDonald Electric & Repair Serv., Inc., 423 So. 
2d 630, 632 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982)). 
 42. 750 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1999). 
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issue falls within the scope of an arbitration provision is “whether the tort 
claim, as alleged in the complaint, arises from and bears such a significant 
relationship to the contract between the parties as to mandate application of 
the arbitration clause.”43  Simply speaking, the court has to balance the con-
tract incorporating the arbitration provision against the allegations set forth 
in the complaint to determine if “a ‘sufficient nexus’ [exists] between the 
two.”44  The Supreme Court of Florida, in Seifert, “concluded that the tort 
claim in that case” failed to connect via a significant relationship to the con-
tract to merit “submission of the cause to arbitration;” the rationale being that 
all of the allegations by the plaintiff failed to assert that any of “the defen-
dant’s duties or obligations arose from or were governed by the contract.”45
Conversely, not too long ago, the Third District Court of Appeal “held that a 
claim for breach of fiduciary duty” against a CEO by his former company 
was within the arbitration provision of the employment contract “because it 
was necessary to examine the contract to ascertain exactly what the CEO’s 
duties [were] to the company.”46
A. A Brief History of Arbitration in Florida 
It is impossible to pinpoint the exact genesis of arbitration but scholars 
believe alternative dispute resolution is from time immemorial.47  The British 
Kingdom had arbitrations dating back before the installation of the common 
law system upon which our American courts are based.48  Domestically, Na-
tive Americans used arbitration as a means of solving intra and inter tribe 
disputes.49  Moreover, even George Washington included a proviso in his 
will that “if any dispute [arose] over the [language] of the document that a 
panel of three arbitrators [must be utilized] to render a final and binding de-
cision to resolve the dispute.”50
 43. Id. at 640. 
 44. The Scope of Arbitration Clauses in Florida, supra note 39; see also Seifert, 750 So. 
2d at 638. 
 45. The Scope of Arbitration Clauses in Florida, supra note 39; see also Seifert, 750 So. 
2d at 640, 642. 
 46. The Scope of Arbitration Clauses in Florida, supra note 39; Burke v. Windjammer 
Barefoot Cruises, 972 So. 2d 1108, 1111–12 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Seifert, 750 
So. 2d at 642). 
 47. MASSEY, supra note 11, para. 3. 
 48. Id.
 49. Id.
 50. Id.
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The first inclusive laws about arbitration in Florida were enacted in 
1828.51  The propagation of arbitration law in Florida was put forth by the 
unicameral Legislative Council.52  These laws were exceptionally analogous 
in many ways to English arbitration law from 1697, which authorized “par-
ties [to] file an agreement to arbitrate with the court that would have jurisdic-
tion over the controversy.”53  Originally, agreements providing for the arbi-
tration of future disputes were unenforceable as executory contracts, which 
were voidable by either party.54  Furthermore, it was common for courts to 
merely renounce enforcement of arbitration clauses over future disputes as a 
matter of public policy against “oust[ing] the jurisdiction of the courts.”55
Judicial hostility combined with the general “reticence of lawyers to venture 
into unfamiliar territory” meant arbitration was a rarely utilized process in 
Florida.56  In fact, a 1954 study found that only a handful of Florida lawyers 
had considerable experience with arbitration and that most lawyers preferred 
litigation over arbitration.57
The impetus for the modern era of arbitration was the New York Legis-
lature’s amendment of the Civil Practice Act in 1920.58  This new law sup-
ported the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate for the first time.59  New 
York’s legislative actions created a buzz about arbitration, which compelled 
“the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to release a draft 
 51. Judith A. Mellman, Comment, Seeking Its Place in the Sun:  Florida’s Emerging 
Role in International Commercial Arbitration, 19 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 363, 367 
(1987–1988).
 52. Id. at 367 n.23.  During this same session, on November 17, 1828, many of the terri-
tory’s civil and criminal laws were established.  Id.
 53. Id. at 367. 
 54. Id. at 367 & n.25. 
 55. Mellman, supra note 51, at 367 n.25. 
 56. Id. at 367. 
 57. Id. at 367 n.26.
 58. Id. at 367; see also Act of Apr. 19, 1920, ch. 275, § 2, 1920 N.Y. Laws 803, 804
(current version at N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7501 (McKinney 1998 & Supp. 2011)). 
The statute’s constitutionality was upheld one year later in Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, 
Inc., 130 N.E. 288, 292 (N.Y. 1921).  It is interesting to note that the Berkovitz decision was 
authored by Judge Cardozo.  Just seven years earlier he had written that:  If jurisdiction is to be 
ousted by contract, we must submit to the failure of justice that may result from these and like 
causes.  It is true that some judges have expressed the belief that parties ought to be free to 
contract about such matters as they please. In this state the law has long been settled to the 
contrary.  The jurisdiction of our courts is established by law, and it is not to be diminished, 
any more than it is to be increased, by the convention of the parties. 
Mellman, supra note 51, at 367–68 n.27 (citations omitted). 
 59. Id. at 367. 
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Uniform Arbitration Statute (“UAS”) in 1924.”60  The UAS was unfortunate-
ly rejected by a majority of states, but it set the stage for the passage of the 
United States Arbitration Act, more commonly known as the Federal Arbi-
tration Act (“FAA”).61  Following the lead of the New York law, the FAA 
“similarly made agreements to arbitrate future disputes enforceable.”62  The 
scope of the FAA was limited to maritime transactions, interstate commerce, 
and foreign commerce.63  However, the Supreme Court of the United States’ 
support of the Act,64 combined with the Act’s nationwide coverage, served to 
intensify sponsorship “for the enactment of modern state arbitration laws.”65
Shortly after the end of World War II, a University of Miami School of Law 
professor, David S. Stern, undertook crafting a contemporary arbitration sta-
tute for Florida for use with commercial arbitration.66  After facing intense 
opposition, Professor Stern’s draft was adopted into Florida law in 1957.67
“Following the lead of Congress, many states, including Florida, have 
also legislated the field of arbitration.”68  Section 682.02 of the Florida Sta-
tutes, which falls within the Florida Arbitration Code,69 expressly affords that 
written contractual provisions calling for settlements of any disputes via arbi-
tration “shall be valid, enforceable, and irrevocable without regard to the 
justiciable character of the controversy.”70  However, the Florida Arbitration 
Code will not apply if the contracting parties exercise the option to specifi-
cally stipulate as such in their agreement.71  For example, in Wickes Corp. v. 
 60. Id. at 367–68; see also HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF 
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FIFTH ANNUAL 
MEETING 21 (1925). 
 61. Mellman, supra note 51, at 368; see also 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1925–1926) (amended 1947). 
 62. Mellman, supra note 51, at 368; see also 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 63. 9 U.S.C. § 1. 
 64. Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263, 279 (1932) (holding the FAA was 
constitutional). 
 65. Mellman, supra note 51, at 368; see also Douglas J. Giuliano, Parochialism in Arbi-
tration?  How Some Arbitration Decisions by Florida Courts Are at Variance with Federal 
Arbitration Precedent, FLA. B.J., Feb. 2007, at 9, 9 (“The result . . . was that ‘[s]tates can no 
longer harbor their historical hostility towards arbitration.’  Indeed, ‘[m]any state legislatures 
also have enacted statutes that encourage the use of arbitration and ensure that agreements to 
arbitrate will be enforced according to their terms and conditions.’” (alteration in original)). 
 66. Mellman, supra note 51, at 368. 
 67. Id.
 68. Michael A. Hanzman, Arbitration Agreements:  Analyzing Threshold Choice of Law 
and Arbitrability Questions, FLA. B.J., Dec. 1996, at 14, 16. 
 69. FLA. STAT. § 682.01 (2012) (providing that “[s]ections 682.01–682.22 may be cited 
as the ‘Florida Arbitration Code’”). 
 70. FLA. STAT. § 682.02. 
 71. Mellman, supra note 51, at 369. 
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Industrial Financial Corp.,72 where the parties clearly expressed their desire 
to not have the Florida Arbitration Code apply, the court held that “their 
rights and duties will be decided according to common law principles.”73
Courts in Florida have reluctantly acknowledged that the goal of the Florida 
Arbitration Code is to bypass protracted litigation and its accompanying 
costs.74  Thus, Florida courts strictly construe arbitration agreements under 
the Florida Arbitration Code, and “only matters expressly covered by the 
arbitration agreement may be arbitrated.”75
Finally, the “general hostility” of the Florida courts plus the inherent re-
strictions of the Florida Arbitration Code handicapped the acceptance of ar-
bitration in Florida.76  Thus, twenty years after the passage of the Florida 
Arbitration Code, “it was [plausible] for one commentator to write that ‘it is 
clear that in Florida arbitration of disputes, other than these [sic] in the labor 
area, are fairly rare.’”77  Despite this, the Florida judiciary eventually sof-
tened its stance and arbitration is now looked upon favorably in the Sunshine 
State.78
B. What is Arbitration? 
Arbitration is one of several modes of alternative dispute resolution.79
Contrary to standard litigation, the adversaries do not resolve their problems 
“in a civil courtroom with a judge and jury making the decision.”80  Instead, 
the parties sanction their controversy to the authority of a single arbitrator or 
a panel of arbiters outside traditional jurisprudential settings—i.e., the cour-
troom or chambers.81  The arbitrator is not technically “a judge, [but] has 
quasi-judicial power[s] to investigate, weigh the evidence presented, and to 
 72. 493 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1974). 
 73. Mellman, supra note 51, at 369 n.40; see also Wickes Corp., 493 F.2d at 1175. 
 74. Mellman, supra note 51, at 369; see, e.g., Merkle v. Rice Constr. Co., 271 So. 2d 
220, 221–22 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1973). 
 75. Mellman, supra note 51, at 369. 
 76. Id. at 370. 
 77. Id.; see also Guy O. Farmer II, Introduction to Arbitration, in ARBITRATION IN 
FLORIDA 1, 9 (1979). 
 78. See Robert J. Hauser et al., Re-examining the Presumption in Favor of Arbitration in 
Complex Commercial Cases, FLA. B.J., Mar. 2010, at 8, 9. 
 79. Todd D. Greene, Arbitration:  Coming to a Contract Near You, HILL WALLACK LLP, 
http://www.hillwallack.com/web-content/news/article_v14n2_08.html (last visited Oct. 28, 
2012). 
 80. Id.
 81. Meah R. Tell, Florida Supreme Court Approved Arbitration Training 31 (Feb. 18, 
2012) (unpublished training manual) (on file with Nova Law Review); Greene, supra note 79. 
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render a final decision to resolve the matter, which is enforceable by a court 
judgment.”82
To start “[t]he arbitration process . . . opposing sides select[] a neutral 
third party” to adjudicate their dispute.83  Generally, once an arbitrator is 
selected, the opposing counsels and judges84 will meet to “discuss the issues 
in dispute and decide on a time frame for their resolution.”85  Next, the indi-
viduals on either side of the dispute will mutually create a formal Arbitration 
Agreement.86  These formal agreements integrate the controversies in their 
entirety and the arbitration proceedings are restricted to resolving only those 
issues raised in the Arbitration Agreement.87
After these initial deeds are accomplished, the parties each make their 
presentations to the arbitrator.88  “The proceedings may or may not be rec-
orded and often do not abide by the rules of evidence used in traditional liti-
gation.”89  Once the parties have completed presenting their respective sides 
of the case, the arbitrator is capable of, and “will, render a final decision.”90
The benefits of arbitration are numerous.91  Proponents of the method 
allege the process to be more efficient, and thus quicker at resolving disputes 
than the courts.92  Arbitration is a private proceeding, which means that “the 
timing of the matter is contingent upon the preparation of the parties” as op-
posed to being subject to the mercy of the court’s caseload.93  An arbitrator 
can swiftly reach a decision, potentially within a few months, as opposed to 
years of litigation.94  “By limiting discovery and the time it takes to resolve 
an issue, the parties often expend less money preparing for and arbitrating a 
matter than litigating in court.”95  Additionally, those who choose to arbitrate 
 82. Greene, supra note 79. 
 83. Id.
 84. Though not officially judges, during arbitration proceedings, the arbitrators are usual-
ly referred to directly as judges, and sometimes even “your honor.”  See Tell, supra note 81, at 
59.  This is due to the lack of better title for the arbitrator within the process of arbitration.  Id.
However, in some cases, usually involving construction contracts, arbitrators are known as 
umpires.  Id.
 85. Greene, supra note 79. 
 86. Id.
 87. Id.
 88. Id.
 89. Id.
 90. Greene, supra note 79. 
 91. See id.
 92. Id.
 93. Id.
 94. Id.; see, e.g., Tell, supra note 81, at 112–14. 
 95. Greene, supra note 79. 
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have the luxury of selecting an arbitrator.96  “The freedom to choose an arbi-
trator is especially beneficial to highly technical disputes.”97  Most parties 
believe it is to their advantage to employ an arbitrator who maintains a high 
level of knowledge or expertise within the field that is the subject of the dis-
pute “because the arbitrator is familiar with the normal course of [business] 
and terms [within] the trade.”98
However, arbitration is not without its disadvantages.99  One of the dis-
advantages of arbitration is the majority of proceedings are based on limited 
discovery.100  Limitations on discovery mean that “both sides may never be 
able to acquire the facts necessary to accurately evaluate the controversy.”101
Ergo, arbitrators potentially could be issuing fallible decisions based on spe-
cious logic resultant from inadequate information.102  Additionally, most ven-
tures forego the rules of evidence, and “while this [may] allow for the free 
flow of information, the protections [from] the rules . . . are essentially 
waived.”103  Finally, it is seen as a large con by many that most arbitration 
decisions are not appealable.104
1. Playing by the Rules 
Through statutory legislation and traditional common law jurispru-
dence, Florida has evinced an extensive set of rules applicable to understand-
ing the arbitrability of disputes.105  No doubt, the most important of these 
rules is in the Florida Arbitration Code. 
 96. Id.
 97. Id.
 98. Id.
 99. See id.
 100. Greene, supra note 79. 
 101. Id.
 102. Id.; see Hauser et al., supra note 78, at 16. 
 103. Greene, supra note 79. 
 104. Scott D. Marrs & Sean P. Milligan, 10 Major Arbitration Issues Recently Addressed 
by Courts, DISP. RESOL. J., Aug.-Oct. 2009, at 38, 42; Barbara Repa, Arbitration Pros and 
Cons, NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/arbitration-pros-cons-29807.html (last 
visited Oct. 28, 2012).  Robert Stone, an Adjunct Professor at Nova Southeastern University 
Shepard Broad Law Center, expressed very similar sentiment among securities lawyers—who 
must regularly arbitrate—during class on August 21, 2012. 
 105. See FLA. STAT. § 682.01 (2012) (stating Chapter 682 of the Florida Statutes encom-
passes the entire Florida Arbitration Code); Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 636 
(Fla. 1999) (providing the three elements to determine arbitrability in Florida); Maguire v. 
King, 917 So. 2d 263, 266 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (stating that torts based in common 
law may sometimes fall within or outside of an arbitration clause while contractually-created 
duties are normally subject to broad arbitration clauses (citing Seifert, 750 So. 2d at 639–41; 
Stacy David Inc. v. Consuegra, 845 So. 2d 303, 306 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003))). 
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Arbitration agreements made valid, irrevocable, and enforce-
able; scope.—Two or more parties may agree in writing to submit 
to arbitration any controversy existing between them at the time of 
the agreement, or they may include in a written contract a provi-
sion for the settlement by arbitration of any controversy thereafter 
arising between them relating to such contract or the failure or re-
fusal to perform the whole or any part thereof.  This section also 
applies to written interlocal agreements under ss. 163.01 and 
373.713 in which two or more parties agree to submit to arbitration 
any controversy between them concerning water use permit appli-
cations and other matters, regardless of whether or not the water 
management district with jurisdiction over the subject application 
is a party to the interlocal agreement or a participant in the arbitra-
tion.  Such agreement or provision shall be valid, enforceable, and 
irrevocable without regard to the justiciable character of the con-
troversy; provided that this act shall not apply to any such agree-
ment or provision to arbitrate in which it is stipulated that this law 
shall not apply or to any arbitration or award thereunder.106
Courts are required to compel arbitration when an agreement to arbitrate 
and an issue within the scope of the agreement co-exist, plus neither of the 
parties has waived their right to arbitration.107  Though courts now generally 
favor compelling arbitration, they can only do so when the provisions in 
question comply with the Florida Arbitration Code.108  “[P]arties [who] resort 
to the statutory mode of arbitration” must substantially comply with statutory 
requirements.109  Thus, if an agreement fails to comply with the Florida Arbi-
tration Code, the courts are unable to enforce or compel specific perfor-
mance.110  For the Florida Arbitration Code to apply, the parties must either:  
(1) “agree in writing to submit to arbitration any controversy existing be-
tween them at the time of the agreement” or (2) include a provision for the 
settlement of controversies thereafter arising between the parties relative to 
the contract or failure to perform or refusal to perform the contract partially 
or wholly.111  The second type of agreement does not controvert the constitu-
 106. FLA. STAT. § 682.02. 
 107. United Healthcare of Fla., Inc. v. Brown, 984 So. 2d 583, 585 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
2008) (quoting Miller & Solomon Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Brennan’s Glass Co., 824 So. 2d 
288, 290 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (per curiam)). 
 108. Avid Eng’g, Inc. v. Orlando Marketplace Ltd., 809 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 
2001) (citing Knight v. H.S. Equities, Inc., 280 So. 2d 456, 459 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
1973)). 
 109. Readdy v. Tampa Electric Co., 41 So. 535, 537 (Fla. 1906). 
 110. Knight, 280 So. 2d at 459. 
 111. FLA. STAT. § 682.02. 
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tional rights of Floridians112 because parties waive their rights to access the 
courts upon “agreeing to arbitration in lieu of litigation.”113  Interestingly, the 
arbitration provisions in contracts do not need to be titled as such.114  The 
Florida courts prefer to stick to an if it quacks like a duck and walks like a 
duck, then it must be a duck analysis.115  The only judicial guidance proffered 
is “[t]he provisions in a contract providing for arbitration must sufficiently 
identify what particular matters are to be submitted to arbitration, and set 
forth some procedures by which arbitration is to be effected.”116  Additional-
ly, the Florida Arbitration Code does not apply retroactively.117  Accordingly, 
“only . . . agreements and provisions for arbitration made subsequent to the 
effective date of the [Florida Arbitration] Code” are subject to it.118
For example, the Fifth District Court of Appeal reviewed the dismissal 
of the complaint of a licensee brought against a licensor and the licensor’s 
president that asserted tort and statutory claims in Marine Environmental 
Partners, Inc. v. Johnson.119  Despite the fact that the licensing agreement 
provided that Colorado law was controlling, the parties failed to argue the 
applicability of Colorado law at any judicial level and predominantly relied 
on Florida law.120  The court held that Florida law was applicable since the 
issue of choice of law was waived by the parties, and Florida was the forum 
state.121
Jurisdiction over arbitration is conferred to the Florida courts when an 
agreement is made subject to the Florida Arbitration Code and provides for 
arbitration in the state, regardless of the province in which the accord was 
made.122  Among other things, once a court has jurisdiction over a claim the 
courts have the authority to enforce arbitration agreements or arbitration 
 112. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21 (“Access to [C]ourts” states that “[t]he courts shall be 
open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, 
denial, or delay.”).  For further discussion see JOHN F. COOPER & THOMAS C. MARKS JR.,
FLORIDA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed. 2006). 
 113. Value Car Sales, Inc. v. Bouton, 608 So. 2d 860, 861 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992). 
 114. See, e.g., Intracoastal Ventures Corp. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 540 So. 2d 162, 163–
64 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989). 
 115. See id. 
 116. Id. at 164. 
 117. 3A FLA. JUR. 2D Arbitration and Award § 10 (2008). 
 118. Id.
 119. 863 So. 2d 423, 424–25 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003). 
 120. Id. at 426. 
 121. Id. (citing Waner v. Ford Motor Co., 331 F.3d 851, 856 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Neely v. 
Club Med Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 63 F.3d 166, 180 (3d Cir. 1995); Terminix Int’l Co. v. Ponzio, 
693 So. 2d 104, 106 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997)). 
 122. 3A FLA. JUR. 2d Arbitration and Award § 11 (2008). 
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clauses in contracts.123  Though parties are free to contract that laws of any 
jurisdiction will be controlling in the result of arbitration, Florida courts will 
not enforce such provisions due to the Florida Arbitration Code.124
When making determinations about whether a claim falls within the po-
tential scope of arbitration courts are required to “look beyond the [mere] 
legal cause of action and examine the factual allegations of the complaint.”125
The wide gaze of the fact-finder is necessary to ensure that only the claims 
the parties intended to arbitrate are compelled.126  Because arbitration agree-
ments are contractual in nature, a trial court’s denial of a motion to compel 
arbitration is an issue of contractual interpretation and thus, subject to the 
appellate court’s de novo review.127
Arbitration is strictly limited to only the disputes “‘which the parties 
have expressly agreed’” to resolve through arbitration.128  Judges shall not 
compel arbitration if there is an “‘absence of express language [mandating 
such] in the . . . contract’” before the court.129  Any questions about the 
 123. FLA. STAT. § 682.18 (2012). 
 124. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 682.02 (West 2003) (referencing provisions for arbitration in 
another state). 
 125. Singer v. Gaines, 896 So. 2d 851, 854 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (citing In re 
Scott, 100 S.W.3d 575, 581 (Tex. App. 2003)).  The financial advisors’ claim that the em-
ployer and its principals “fraudulently induced him into entering into an employment con-
tract,” arose out of the employment, and thus, the claim was subject to arbitration under Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) Code of Arbitration.  Id. at 852–53.  The 
advisors’ claims that the defendants “falsely represented that they would provide him with 
ample support staff, significant marketing programs, and guidance from producers who had 
made more than $2.7 million in revenue in the prior year,” id. at 852, “necessarily require[d] 
evaluation of . . . performance of the defendants as an employer of [a] broker[].”  Id. at 855. 
 126. See Vargas v. Schweitzer-Ramras, 878 So. 2d 415, 417 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2004) 
(per curiam). 
 127. Engle Homes, Inc. v. Jones, 870 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (quot-
ing Ocwen Fed. Bank FSB v. LVWD, Ltd., 766 So. 2d 248, 249 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
2000)). 
 128. Vargas, 878 So. 2d at 417 (quoting Atencio v. U.S. Sec. Ins. Co., 676 So. 2d 489, 490 
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996)) (citing Miller v. Roberts, 682 So. 2d 691, 692 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. 
App. 1996); Regency Grp., Inc. v. McDaniels, 647 So. 2d 192, 193 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 
1994) (per curiam)). 
 129. Morgan Stanley DW Inc. v. Halliday, 873 So. 2d 400, 404 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
2004) (quoting Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 642 (Fla. 1999)) (citing First 
Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995)). 
Finally, appellee argues that the trial court was correct to deny the motion to compel arbitration 
because there was no agreement that tort claims would be subject to arbitration.  We find the 
instant case clearly distinguishable.  Here, the agreement containing the arbitration clause obli-
gated appellant to provide appropriate care to the decedent, and the dispute alleges that appel-
lant failed to provide appropriate care.  It certainly appears to us that there is a strong nexus be-
tween the dispute giving rise to the lawsuit and the contract containing the arbitration clause.  
That the claim sounds in negligence (failure to exercise reasonable care) rather than breach of 
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scope—or questions regarding waiver—should be resolved in favor of arbi-
tration rather than against it.130  In addition, Florida courts should conclude 
any and all doubts about the reach of arbitration agreements with favoritism 
towards arbitration.131  Remarkably, the courts in Florida fail to mention how 
to balance the public policy of favoring arbitration when weighed against the 
presumption of mistakes in contractual drafting being held against the draf-
ter.132
Public policy in Florida is partial to arbitration “as an efficient means of 
[dispute settlement]” since it generally “avoids the delays and expenses of 
litigation.”133  It is important to remember the essential purpose of these qua-
si-judicial proceedings is “‘freedom from the formality of ordinary judicial 
procedure.’”134  Nevertheless, even though courts look upon arbitration 
agreements with favor, parties who seek to exercise their arbitrational rights 
must safeguard them.135  The appellate court in the Second District reversed a 
contract (failure to fulfill a contractual obligation) does not ipso facto sever an otherwise sig-
nificant relationship between the contractual obligation and the matter in dispute.  The trial 
court found the dispute to be arbitrable and we do as well. 
Consol. Res. Healthcare Fund I, Ltd. v. Fenelus, 853 So. 2d 500, 505–06 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. 
App. 2003) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). 
 130. See EMSA Ltd. P’ship v. Mason, 677 So. 2d 105, 107 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996) 
(quoting Ronbeck Constr. Co. v. Savanna Club Corp., 592 So. 2d 344, 346 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. 
App. 1992)). 
 131. Ronbeck Constr. Co., 592 So. 2d at 346–47 (property “owner’s claim for rescission of 
[construction] contract [was] subject to arbitration” where property owner's fraud claims that 
formed the basis of rescission were “predicated on events dealing with performance [of] the . . 
. contract, rather than its making” or inducement). 
 132. See, e.g., Engle Homes, Inc., 870 So. 2d at 910–11 (holding that an arbitration provi-
sion in a purchase agreement did compel arbitration but remained silent on the presumption of 
mistakes in contractual drafting being held against the drafter); Avid Eng’g, Inc. v. Orlando 
Marketplace Ltd., 809 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (involving no mention of the 
presumption of mistakes in contractual drafting being held against the drafter in their deci-
sion); Intracoastal Ventures Corp. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 540 So. 2d 162, 164–65 (Fla. 4th 
Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that an appraisal clause was not an arbitration clause by its plain 
language, but not mentioning the presumption of mistakes in contractual drafting being held 
against the drafter). 
 133. KFC Nat’l Mgmt. Co. v. Beauregard, 739 So. 2d 630, 631 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 
1999) (citing Gale Grp., Inc. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 683 So. 2d 661, 663 (Fla. 5th 
Dist. Ct. App. 1996)); see also Johnson v. Wells, 73 So. 188, 190–91 (Fla. 1916) (acknowl-
edging that arbitration expedites and facilitates the settlement of disputes, thereby avoiding the 
formalities, delay, and expense of ordinary litigation).  But see Hauser et al., supra note 78, at 
14. 
 134. Cassara v. Wofford, 55 So. 2d 102, 106 (Fla. 1951) (quoting Sapp v. Barenfeld, 212 
P.2d 233, 237 (Cal. 1949) (in bank)). 
 135. Williams ex rel. Estate of Williams v. Manor Care of Dunedin, Inc., 923 So. 2d 615, 
616 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Saldukas, 896 
So. 2d 707, 711 (Fla. 2005)). 
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trial court’s finding that there was no waiver of the right when the appellee—
defendant below—failed to answer the complaint in a manner consistent with 
those rights.136  Therefore, one can either expressly waive their right to arbi-
trate or implicitly do so by acting in a manner inconsistent with the right to 
arbitrate.137
The Florida Jurisprudence, Second Edition does provide a stern word 
of caution regarding Florida’s public policy favoring arbitration by remind-
ing attorneys that every rule has exceptions.138
Caution:  Where legislation clearly mandates that a particular issue 
or type of dispute be resolved in a judicial forum, the policy favor-
ing arbitration will yield.  Other exceptions to the policy favoring 
the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate arise where public poli-
cy is said to require that a matter in issue be determined by a court.  
There is a narrow class of cases that have been excepted from arbi-
tration on public policy grounds, but an incidental effect on the 
public policy of the state is insufficient to remove a claim from ar-
bitration where there is an agreement to arbitrate. 
Arbitration is an alternative to the court system and limited review 
is necessary to prevent arbitration from becoming merely an added 
preliminary step to judicial resolution rather than a true alterna-
tive.139
Above all else, attorneys facing motions to compel arbitration should 
always remember that these agreements and provisions are contractual in 
nature, thus Floridian benches will view them matter-of-factly:  “Like all 
contracts, each arbitration agreement is unique.  Although it may employ 
some standard terms, the contract must be construed and understood in light 
of its whole text, context, structure and purpose . . . [and] the entire undertak-
ing must be considered.”140
2. How is Arbitration Compelled? 
Because this article focuses on the test to determine the arbitrability of 
tort claims only slightly touching contracts, it is not necessary to dive into a 
 136. Id. at 617. 
 137. Cassara, 55 So. 2d at 106; Williams ex rel. Estate of Williams, 923 So. 2d at 617. 
 138. 3A FLA. JUR. 2D Arbitration and Award § 4 (2008). 
 139. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 140. Aberdeen Golf & Country Club v. Bliss Constr., Inc., 932 So. 2d 235, 236 (Fla. 4th 
Dist. Ct. App. 2005). 
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detailed discussion on how to compel such claims.  It is important to note 
that the issue being covered below—save for when parties expressly opt to 
use common law—generally arises when the parties follow the procedures 
set forth in the Florida Arbitration Code.141  Thus, this section is only in-
tended as a rudimentary primer to further the understanding of the reader. 
Below is the practical procedure, as stated in the Florida Statutes, that 
an attorney must follow in Florida to initiate and have proceedings that can 
compel arbitration.142
682.03 Proceedings to compel and to stay arbitration.–
(1) A party to an agreement or provision for arbitration subject to 
this law claiming the neglect or refusal of another party thereto to 
comply therewith may make application to the court for an order 
directing the parties to proceed with arbitration in accordance with 
the terms thereof.  If the court is satisfied that no substantial issue 
exists as to the making of the agreement or provision, it shall grant 
the application.  If the court shall find that a substantial issue is 
raised as to the making of the agreement or provision, it shall 
summarily hear and determine the issue and, according to its de-
termination, shall grant or deny the application. 
(2) If an issue referable to arbitration under an agreement or provi-
sion for arbitration subject to this law becomes involved in an ac-
tion or proceeding pending in a court having jurisdiction to hear an 
application under subsection (1), such application shall be made in 
said court.  Otherwise and subject to [section] 682.19, such appli-
cation may be made in any court of competent jurisdiction. 
(3) Any action or proceeding involving an issue subject to arbitra-
tion under this law shall be stayed if an order for arbitration or an 
application therefor [sic] has been made under this section or, if 
the issue is severable, the stay may be with respect thereto only.  
When the application is made in such action or proceeding, the or-
der for arbitration shall include such stay. 
(4) On application the court may stay an arbitration proceeding 
commenced or about to be commenced, if it shall find that no 
agreement or provision for arbitration subject to this law exists be-
tween the party making the application and the party causing the 
arbitration to be had.  The court shall summarily hear and deter-
 141. FLA. STAT. § 682.03 (2012). 
 142. See id.
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mine the issue of the making of the agreement or provision and, 
according to its determination, shall grant or deny the application. 
(5) An order for arbitration shall not be refused on the ground that 
the claim in issue lacks merit or bona fides or because any fault or 
grounds for the claim sought to be arbitrated have not been 
shown.143
Basically, when a court is hearing a motion to compel arbitration under 
the Florida Arbitration Code, it must decide whether or not to compel arbitra-
tion based on three elements.144  First, the court must determine that a valid 
written arbitration agreement exists.145  If the court finds that an agreement to 
arbitrate exists, then it must determine whether an arbitrable issue exists; and 
finally, if either party waived its right to arbitration.146
III. THE CASE AT HAND: JACKSON V. THE SHAKESPEARE FOUNDATION, INC.
A. How Did We Get Here? 
The case sub judice arose when the Supreme Court of Florida entered 
an order accepting jurisdiction, resulting from the First District Court of Ap-
peal certifying conflict with the Fifth District Court of Appeal.147  The pro-
ceeding before the court began when the respondent, Shakespeare Founda-
tion (“Shakespeare”), along with its development team, Herd Community 
Development Corporation (“Herd”), filed a complaint against the petitioners, 
George Jackson, Kerry Jackson, and Jackson Realty Team, Inc. (“Jack-
son(s)”) in March of 2009.148  The complaint alleged “that the Jacksons had 
fraudulently misrepresented, [among other things], the existence of wetlands 
on certain real property in Bay County, Florida, that had been purchased by 
Shakespeare and Herd from the Jacksons.”149  Specifically, the respondents 
 143. Id.
 144. H. Michael Muñiz, Compelling Arbitration of Disputes—The Florida v. Federal Law 
Quagmire, FLA. B.J., Dec. 2006, at 31, 32. 
 145. Id.
 146. Id.  For a more in-depth discussion on the issues related to compelling arbitration, the 
reader should consult Compelling Arbitration of Disputes—The Florida v. Federal Law 
Quagmire. Id.
 147. Jackson II, 74 So. 3d 1083, 1083 (Fla. 2011) (unpublished table decision); Jackson I,
61 So. 3d 1194, 1200–01 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.) (discussing Maguire v. King, 917 So. 2d 
263, 266 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005)), review granted, 74 So. 3d 1083 (Fla. 2011). 
 148. Respondents’ Answer Brief on the Merits, supra note 17, at 1. 
 149. Petitioners’ Brief on Jurisdiction at 2, Jackson v. Shakespeare Found., Inc., 74 So. 3d 
1083 (Fla. 2011) (No. SC11-1196). 
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complained that the petitioners “fraudulently misrepresented . . . the . . . 
property . . . [as] ‘a great affordable housing project’ and that [a] ‘wetland 
study verifies no wetlands.’”150  Furthermore, Shakespeare and Herd claim 
that the damages suffered were a direct result of the fraudulent misrepresen-
tation151 since Florida law could prevent development of the portion of prop-
erty containing wetlands.152
In their responsive pleading, “[t]he Jacksons filed a motion to dismiss 
[established upon] the existence of an arbitration clause contained within the 
contract,”153 requiring the parties “to resolve the[ir] dispute through neutral 
binding arbitration.”154  The lower court granted the Jacksons’ motion, caus-
ing Shakespeare and Herd to timely file an appeal.155  The First District Court 
of Appeal held in favor of the appellant-plaintiffs, thereby reversing the or-
der of the trial court.156  Lastly, “[t]he Jacksons . . . filed their Notice to In-
voke Discretionary Jurisdiction.”157
1. The Facts of the Case 
Mr. and Mrs. Jackson owned property at 915 Everett Avenue, Panama 
City, Florida, which Shakespeare and Herd agreed to purchase for 
$253,000.158  Shakespeare and Herd did so with the intent to develop twenty-
seven affordable housing units upon that tract of land.159  The Jacksons ad-
 150. Respondents’ Answer Brief on the Merits, supra note 17, at 2. 
 151. Petitioners’ Initial Brief on the Merits, supra note 30, at 2. 
 152. Id. at 2–3. 
 The controversy regarding the preservation of wetlands involves two diametrically op-
posed and equally important interests:  [T]he maintenance of Florida's sensitive ecology and 
the continued increase in Florida's population.  As Florida's population increases, the need for 
land development proportionately increases.  Since a large portion of Florida's undeveloped 
landmass is comprised of wetlands, and wetlands are relatively easy and inexpensive to devel-
op, wetlands have been targeted by many developers as the construction site of choice.  How-
ever, given the important role that wetlands play in Florida's ecology, the State protects wet-
lands by regulating their development. 
Tirso M. Carreja, Jr., Adding A Statutory Stick to the Bundle of Rights:  Florida’s Ability to 
Regulate Wetlands Under Current Takings Jurisprudence and Under the Private Property 
Rights Protection Act of 1995, 11 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 423, 423–24 (1996) (footnote 
omitted); see FLA. STAT. § 373.414(1) (2012). 
 153. Petitioners’ Initial Brief on the Merits, supra note 30, at 3. 
 154. Respondents’ Answer Brief on the Merits, supra note 17, at 2. 
 155. Id.
 156. Jackson I, 61 So. 3d 1194, 1196, 1201 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 74 
So. 3d 1083 (Fla. 2011); Respondents’ Answer Brief on the Merits, supra note 17, at 2. 
 157. Respondents’ Answer Brief on the Merits, supra note 17, at 2–3. 
 158. Id. at 3, 5. 
 159. Id. at 5. 
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vertised the parcel of land on the Bay County Multiple Listing Service.160
The real estate advertisement posted by the petitioners contained a long pa-
ragraph about the prospective parcel, and the petitioners stated, among other 
things, that the parcel was an “‘affordable housing project’ and that [the] 
‘wetland study verifies no wetlands.’”161  The respondents argued that this 
claim was a fraudulent misrepresentation, forcing them to suffer damages 
“because the presence of . . . wetlands prevented them from developing a 
portion of the property.”162
Once the property was purchased by Shakespeare and Herd, the devel-
oper began preparations to move into the construction phases of his plan.163
The initial step was “an onsite meeting . . . with their builder and engi-
neer.”164  During the meeting, the builder observed “the foliage and the gen-
eral lay of the land [causing him to opine] . . . that the subject property might 
contain some wetlands.”165  Upon contacting the surveyor used by the peti-
tioners,166 the respondents learned that according to the surveyor, someone 
was hired to “‘walk the property,’” and from that stroll, the plot was declared 
wetland free.167  Subsequent to this revelation, Shakespeare and Herd hired 
their own team to conduct an in-depth wetlands survey, which revealed the 
real estate to be twenty-six percent wetlands, and thus twenty-six percent 
unbuildable.168
The purchase and sale agreement (“Contract”) for the parcel at 915 Eve-
rett Avenue contained an arbitration agreement clause in the Dispute Resolu-
 160. Id. at 3. 
 161. Id. at 2 (quoting Complaint, supra note 17, at 3–4). 
 162. Petitioners’ Initial Brief on the Merits, supra note 30, at 2. 
 At the time the above advertisement was posted by the Jacksons or Jackson Realty on the 
Bay County Multiple Listing Service, the Jacksons had in their possession a Property Report 
Land Use Planning Analysis prepared by Ron Thomasson, A.T.C.P., Land Use Consulting, 
showing that, in fact, 25% of the land was in wetlands.  The Jacksons purchased the property 
shortly before listing it for sale through the Bay County Multiple Listing Service.  Ms. Jackson 
used the above-referenced report to negotiate the purchase price of the subject property from 
the prior owner from $175,000.00 down to $145,000.00. 
Respondents’ Answer Brief on the Merits, supra note 17, at 4. 
 163. Id. at 5. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id.
 166. Id. at 5–6.  The company hired by the Jacksons in connection with the property prep-
arations was North Bay Engineering.  Respondents’ Answer Brief on the Merits, supra note 
17, at 5. 
 167. Id. (emphasis added).  “Shakespeare and Herd then contacted Ms. Jackson who stated 
that she would provide a copy of the wetland study and a fill permit.  As of the date of filing 
the Complaint, no copy of a wetlands report or fill permit report had been provided to Shakes-
peare and Herd.”  Id. at 5–6. 
 168. Id. at 6. 
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tion section that “survive[d] the closing of the property . . . [and] state[d], in 
pertinent part:”169
14.  DISPUTE RESOLUTION:  This Contract will be construed 
under Florida law.  All controversies, claims, and other matters in 
question arising out of or relating to this transaction or this Con-
tract or its breach will be settled as follows: 
. . . 
(b) All other disputes:  Buyer and Seller will have 30 days from 
the date a dispute arises between them to attempt to resolve the 
matter through mediation, failing which the parties will resolve the 
dispute through neutral binding arbitration in the county where the 
Property is located.  The arbitration may not alter the Contract 
terms or award any remedy not provided for in this Contract . . . 
.
170
“The award will be based on the greater eight [sic] of the evidence and will 
state findings of fact and the contractual authority on which it is based.”171
“This clause shall survive closing.”172
Because the above contract language does not specifically name the 
causes of action that are subject to arbitration and the parties remain divided 
on the issue, it is up to the court to determine whether the respondents’ fraud 
in the inducement claim falls within the arbitrable realm.173
B. Threshold Issues for the Court to Determine 
In deciding Jackson II, the court must not forget that in Florida, arbitra-
tion is the “preferred mechanism of dispute resolution, and . . . any doubt[s] 
regarding the arbitrability of a claim should be resolved in favor of allowing 
arbitration.”174  The Supreme Court of Florida has even gone so far as to dec-
 169. Petitioners’ Brief on Jurisdiction, supra note 149, at 2; see also Respondents’ Answer 
Brief on the Merits, supra note 17, at 2. 
 170. Respondents’ Amended Brief on Jurisdiction at 1, Jackson v. Shakespeare Found., 
Inc., 74 So. 3d 1083 (Fla. 2011) (No. SC11-1196) (alteration in original); see also Petitioners’ 
Brief on Jurisdiction, supra note 149, at 2–3. 
 171. Petitioners’ Brief on Jurisdiction, supra note 149, at 3. 
 172. Respondents’ Amended Brief on Jurisdiction, supra note 170, at 1. 
 173. See id.; Maguire v. King, 917 So. 2d 263, 266–67 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005); see 
also Petitioner’s Brief on Jurisdiction, supra note 149, at 5 (citing Maguire, 917 So. 2d at 
264–66). 
 174. Cavendish, supra note 26, at 19. 
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lare that when agreements are subject to the Florida Arbitration Code, 
“‘courts [will] indulge every reasonable presumption to uphold proceedings 
resulting in an award.’”175  As a result, it is not a stretch for one to claim 
Florida has a very pro-arbitration policy.176  “This gloss of public policy 
gives rise to a judicially employed rule of construction for arbitration lan-
guage in a valid contract—the rule of maximum breadth.”177  Under the in-
structions of this rule, judges are to consider arbitration clauses giving the 
“‘broadest possible interpretation to accomplish the salutary purpose of re-
solving controversies out of court.’”178
To the uninitiated, reading the preceding rules governing arbitration 
along with the overlay of strong policy, it may appear as if questions regard-
ing arbitrability consistently return the same unyielding answer—this is an 
understandable misconception.179  What appears as a “monolith” of Florida 
law is in reality a hollow shell.180  This is because Florida courts have yet 
another important rule which commands “that, under the Florida Arbitration 
Code, no party may be forced into arbitrating something they did not agree to 
arbitrate, notwithstanding the general rule favoring arbitration.”181  In other 
words, Florida courts adhere to contractual ideals, whereby contracts con-
taining arbitration provisions “are to be carefully construed so as not to force 
a nonarbitrable issue into arbitration.”182
This leads us to a crossroads at which formidable judicial ideals steadily 
impede marked pro-arbitration preference ingrained in Florida law and pub-
lic policy.183  Clearly, the courts are referring to the basic notion of intent;184
intent meaning that “part[ies] cannot be [forced] to submit to arbitration” 
where a party neither intended nor agreed to arbitration.185  Hence, in spite of 
conventional wisdom favoring arbitration, Florida courts will only allow 
arbitration of a particular dispute based on contractual proviso if the four 
 175. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Roe v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 533 So. 2d 279, 281 
(Fla. 1988)). 
 176. Id.
 177. Id. at 20. 
 178. Id. (quoting Auchter Co. v. Zagloul, 949 So. 2d 1189, 1195 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 
2007); Benedict v. Pensacola Motor Sales, Inc., 846 So. 2d 1238, 1240 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 
2003)). 
 179. Cavendish, supra note 26, at 20. 
 180. Id.
 181. Id.
 182. Id.
 183. Id.
 184. Cavendish, supra note 26, at 20. 
 185. Rolls-Royce PLC v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., 960 So. 2d 768, 770 (Fla. 3d Dist. 
Ct. App. 2007) (quoting AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 648 
(1986)); see also Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 636 (Fla. 1999). 
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corners of the document evince the “parties’ intent to submit that particular 
dispute to arbitration.”186  Conversely conceptualized, the judicial corollary 
instruct that when arbitration clause language unmistakably constructs arbi-
tral blockades—precluding certain types of claims by a party—the interpret-
ing bench can positively conclude the intent of the parties was to exclude any 
“extra-contractual or extra-textual claim[s]” from arbitration.187  The main-
tenance of this ideal of requiring contractual intent provides balance to the 
rule of maximum breadth stemming from public policy favoring arbitra-
tion.188  Though both axioms find plenty of support in decisional reporters, 
one must note that contract law wins the battle against arbitration-based 
law.189
Finally, the main threshold question must be answered:  How do we de-
termine which disputes are appropriate for arbitration?190  According to the 
Supreme Court of Florida, there must be “some nexus [linking] the dispute 
[with] the contract containing the arbitration clause.”191
1. The Intent of the Parties 
With clear regard to the public policy and judicial ideal, the Supreme 
Court of Florida has instructed that the first hurdle to clear when considering 
arbitrability is the intent of the parties to arbitrate appropriate disputes.192
The intention to arbitrate can be express193 or actual.194
 186. Cavendish, supra note 26, at 20. 
 187. Id.
 188. Id.
 189. Id.; see, e.g., Hirshenson v. Spaccio, 800 So. 2d 670, 675–76 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 
2001). 
There are maxims supporting this corollary in almost equal number to the reported judicial 
language supporting the expansive rule of maximum breadth, such as, for example, “[i]t is the 
intention as expressed by the language employed in the agreements that governs, not the after-
the-fact testimony of the parties.”  Within this corollary, intent, subject to the common law and 
evidence code filters restricting how contracting intent may be demonstrated, will seem to car-
ry the day in a dispute over arbitrability. 
Cavendish, supra note 26, at 20 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
 190. See Seifert, 750 So. 2d at 638. 
 191. Id.
 192. Id. at 636 (quoting Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Trailer Train Co., 690 F.2d 1343, 
1348, 1352 (11th Cir. 1982)); see Maguire v. King, 917 So. 2d 263, 266 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. 
App. 2005) (citing Seifert, 750 So. 2d 636). 
 193. Rosenhaus v. Star Sports, Inc., 929 So. 2d 40, 42 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006)  
(citing Atencio v. U.S. Sec. Ins. Co., 676 So. 2d 489, 490 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).  
Express, refers to contractual language that explicitly states the parties’ intentions.  BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 17c (9th ed. 2009). 
 194. Medanic v. Citicorp Inv. Servs., 954 So. 2d 1210, 1211 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.) (cit-
ing Citigroup, Inc. v. Amodio, 894 So. 2d 296, 298–99 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005)), rev’d
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In determining the intent of the parties, consideration is only given to 
the language of the contract, and the “‘after-the-fact testimony of the par-
ties’” is summarily disregarded.195  “Where questioned transactions involving 
matters not covered by an arbitration clause are inextricably interwoven with 
a subject which is expressly subject to the clause, an order requiring that the 
issues be submitted to arbitration is proper.”196
The second hurdle in the preliminary step of determining the ambit of 
an arbitration clause is classifying the clause as either broad or narrow.197
The Supreme Court of Florida has distinguished between broad and narrow 
arbitration provisions.198  “Narrow arbitration clauses are those that require 
disputes ‘arising out of’ or ‘under’ a contract to arbitration.”199  On the other 
hand, “[b]road arbitration provisions are those that require claims ‘arising out 
of or relating to’ a contract to be arbitrated.”200  Florida courts have also 
stated that the “language providing for . . . arbitration of ‘any and all’ 
[claims] . . . [i]s broad,” and includes all controversies or disputes arising 
from the contract.201
When a provision is found to be broad, the presumption in favor of arbi-
tration can only be rebutted by “the most forceful evidence of an intent to 
exclude a particular claim from arbitration.”202  Therefore, when an arbitra-
tion provision is found to be broad, it plays right to the strength of Florida’s 
public policy favoring arbitration.203  But all coins have two sides, and the 
contra positive is that when a provision is found to be narrow—such as when 
in part, 958 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).  In this context, the term “actual” is 
analogous to “implied,” and means the intention of the parties which can be discerned from 
the language used by the parties in their agreement.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 17c (9th ed. 
2009). 
 195. Maguire, 917 So. 2d at 266 (quoting Bill Heard Chevrolet Corp., Orlando v. Wilson, 
877 So. 2d 15, 18 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004)).  This step is always part of the analysis, but 
not necessarily always the second part.  See Gendzier v. Bielecki, 97 So. 2d 604, 608–09 (Fla. 
1957); Wilson, 877 So. 2d at 18. 
 196. 3A FLA. JUR. 2D Arbitration and Award § 31 (2008). 
 197. See Seifert, 750 So. 2d at 636–38.  The court makes this determination by examining 
the wording of the arbitration clause.  See id. 
 198. Id.
 199. Jackson I, 61 So. 3d 1194, 1198 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.) (citing Seifert, 750 So. 2d at 
636–37), review granted, 74 So. 3d 1083 (Fla. 2011). 
 200. Id. (citing Seifert, 750 So. 2d at 636–37). 
 201. Cavendish, supra note 26, at 22. 
 202. Id.
 203. See id. at 19–20, 22. 
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the parties use special purpose maxims—the balance shifts in favor of the 
judicial ideals respecting the parties’ intent.204
In Jackson I, the First District Court of Appeal held that the arbitration 
provision in the sale and purchase agreement between Jackson and Shakes-
peare to be broad under Florida precedent.205  This is because the language in 
the clause within the contract states that “‘[a]ll controversies, claims, and 
other matters in question arising out of or relating to this transaction or this 
Contract or its breach’ to be arbitrated,” places it within the broad category 
promulgated by the Supreme Court of Florida.206
2. The Seifert Test for Arbitrability 
The Supreme Court of Florida describes how to undertake finding 
“some nexus between the dispute and the contract containing the arbitration 
clause.”207  The court evinced a three element test to properly determine if a 
given dispute is arbitrable:  “(1) whether a valid written agreement to arbi-
trate exists; (2) whether an arbitrable issue exists; and (3) whether the right to 
arbitration was waived.”208
This three-prong test and its aimed-at findings (for the existence of 
arbitrability) of “valid agreement/yes, arbitrable issue/yes, waiv-
er/no” has a jurisprudential gloss of its own.  While applying this 
test, Florida courts will instruct that arbitrability depends upon the 
relationship between the claim and the agreement, not the legal la-
bel attached to the dispute.  What this means is that the heart of 
this three-prong test is the second prong, “arbitrable issue.”209
Therefore, once a contractual arbitration provision is deemed broad by the 
court, the test for determining the arbitrability of the claim is the presence of 
 204. See id. at 22. 
For example, Florida courts opine that intent not to arbitrate a claim is evidenced through 
omission where an arbitration clause does not refer to the subject matter being contested.  In 
another example, Florida courts state that intent not to arbitrate a claim can be evidenced 
through exclusion where the clause narrowly tailors its language to define or limit the scope of 
arbitrable issues. 
Id. 
 205. Jackson I, 61 So. 3d at 1198. 
 206. Id.
 207. Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 636, 638 (Fla. 1999). 
 208. Id. at 636 (citing Terminix Int’l Co. v. Ponzio, 693 So. 2d 104, 106 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. 
App. 1997)). 
 209. Cavendish, supra note 26, at 22. 
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a “‘significant relationship’” between the contract containing the broad 
clause and the cause of action.210
The First District Court of Appeal concluded that Shakespeare and 
Herd’s claim failed the contractual nexus test despite the fact that the parties 
would not have been adversaries but for the existence of the real estate con-
tract.211  The appellate court reasoned that “the claim at the center of the dis-
pute arose from a general duty owed under common law.”212  Continuing 
further, the majority declared that torts must at least instigate some question 
that can only be resolved by “‘reference to or construction of [or interpreta-
tion of] some portion of the contract itself.’”213  The rationale behind this 
decision is that the claim of fraud in the inducement rests solely on Jackson’s 
Multiple Listing Service (MLS) advertisements, therefore not requiring any 
reference to or construction of the contract.214  Further bolstering this point, 
the bench contended that “[t]he contract here is incidental to the dispute, 
because [Shakespeare and Herd] . . . could have raised their . . . claim even 
before the contract was signed if [they] detrimentally relied on [Jackson’s] 
advertisement.”215
C. The Petitioners’ Arguments 
The petitioners raise two arguments in their brief to the Supreme Court 
of Florida.216  First, the Jacksons’ claim that the respondent-plaintiffs’ “ac-
tion for fraudulent inducement . . . requires [both] reference . . . and interpre-
tation of the contract . . . [and therefore] is significantly related to the con-
tract.”217  The second argument the petitioners raise is the undisputed nature 
of the arbitration provision as broad means it is all encompassing as to dis-
 210. Seifert, 750 So. 2d at 637–38 (citing Am. Recovery Corp. v. Computerized Thermal 
Imaging, Inc., 96 F.3d 88, 93 (4th Cir. 1996)). 
 211. Jackson I, 61 So. 3d at 1198–99 (citing Seifert, 750 So. 2d at 638). 
 212. Id. at 1198.  This seems to be the crux of the issue of the certified conflict between 
the First District Court of Appeal and the Fifth District Court of Appeal, though it is not evi-
dently clear from the opinion.  See id. at 1198, 1201; Maguire v. King, 917 So. 2d 263, 268 
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
 213. Jackson I, 61 So. 3d at 1198 (quoting Seifert, 750 So. 2d at 638). 
 214. See id. at 1199. 
 215. Id.
 Appellees rely on Beazer Homes Corp. v. Bailey, 940 So. 2d 453, 455 (Fla. 5th [Dist. Ct. 
App.] 2006), in support of their argument that the fraud claim here bore a significant relation-
ship to the contract.  Beazer Homes, however, did not result in an opinion of the Fifth District, 
as two judges on the panel concurred in result only.
Id. (citing Beazer Homes Corp. v. Bailey, 940 So. 2d 453, 455 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006)). 
 216. Petitioners’ Initial Brief on the Merits, supra note 30, at 5, 12. 
 217. Id. at 5, 8–10. 
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putes between the parties.218  Thus, an action for fraud in the inducement falls 
squarely within the provision.219
Addressing the first issue, the petitioners give a brief dissertation on the 
history of Seifert, whereby they attempt to factually distinguish their case 
from that hallmark decision, while urging the court to adopt the reasoning of 
Maguire v. King.220  Howbeit, the true crux of the Jacksons’ argument is that 
the respondents had a contractually imposed duty to perform a feasibility 
study.221  This is based on a land use provision in the contract.222
6.  LAND USE:  Seller will deliver the Property to Buyer at the 
time agreed in its present “as is” condition, with conditions result-
ing from Buyer's inspections and casualty damage, if any, ex-
cepted. 
. . . . 
 (c) Inspections:  (check (1) or (2) below) 
(1) Feasibility Study:  Buyer will, at Buyer's expense and within 
30 days from Effective Date (“Feasibility Study Period”), deter-
mine whether the Property is suitable, in Buyer's sole and absolute 
discretion, for use.  During the Feasibility Study Period, Buyer 
may conduct a Phase 1 environmental assessment and any other 
tests, analyses, surveys and investigations (“inspections”) that 
Buyer deems necessary to determine to Buyer's satisfaction the 
Property's engineering, architectural and environmental properties 
. . . to determine the Property's suitability for the Buyer's intended 
use. 
. . . . 
Buyer will deliver written notice to Seller prior to the expiration 
of the Feasibility Study Period of Buyer's determination of wheth-
er or not the Property is acceptable.  Buyer's failure to comply 
with this notice requirement will constitute acceptance of the 
Property as suitable for Buyer's intended use in its “as is” condi-
tion.  If the Property is unacceptable to the Buyer and written no-
 218. Id. at 12. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at 5–8, 10–11 (citing Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 635–38, 640, 
642–43 (Fla. 1999); Maguire v. King, 917 So. 2d 263, 266 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005)). 
 221. Petitioners’ Initial Brief on the Merits, supra note 30, at 8–9. 
 222. Id.
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tice of this fact is timely delivered to Seller, this Contract will be 
deemed terminated as of the day after the Feasibility Study period 
ends and Buyer's deposit(s) will be returned after Escrow Agent 
receives proper authorization from all interested parties. 
(2) No Feasibility Study:  Buyer is satisfied that the property is 
suitable for Buyer's purposes . . . [t]his Contract is not contingent 
on Buyer conducting any further investigations.223
The respondents checked option one in favor of a feasibility study.224  In 
their complaint, Shakespeare and Herd allege that had they been aware of the 
presence of wetlands—a fact misrepresented by the sellers in their adver-
tisement—“they would not have purchased the property.”225  The petitioners 
rely on the above clause to show that Shakespeare had a contractually-
imposed duty to perform a study on the property.226  This is a specious argu-
ment since the clause above actually imposes no duty.227  The clause provides 
the procedure taken, and the time available for the buyer to refuse the proper-
ty.228  The clause is in essence a sophisticated return policy.229  This is indi-
cated by the fact that under Option One the buyers are taking the property 
“as is” with the option to terminate within thirty days to perform a study.230
The will provisions for the buyer under this clause are for the buyer to de-
termine, at his discretion, if the property is suitable for use.231  However, if 
the buyer does not find the property up to par, the remaining will provisions 
guide the acceptable method for rejecting the property.232  If the buyer fails to 
comply with the will provisions the buyer is accepting the property as suita-
ble in its “as is” condition.233  The remainder of the terminology in the clause 
includes may provisions—“may conduct a Phase [one] . . . assessment”—
which means the buyer is not under a duty to do so.234  The buyer has the 
option to let the thirty days lapse and accept the property in its current condi-
tion.235  The duties under this provision only arise in the event that the buyer 
 223. Id. at 8–9. 
 224. Id. at 9. 
 225. Id. at 8; see Complaint, supra note 17, at 4. 
 226. Petitioners’ Initial Brief on the Merits, supra note 30, at 8–10. 
 227. Respondents’ Answer Brief on the Merits, supra note 17, at 29. 
 228. Petitioners’ Initial Brief on the Merits, supra note 30, at 8–9. 
 229. See id.
 230. Id.
 231. Id.
 232. Id.
 233. Petitioners’ Initial Brief on the Merits, supra note 30, at 8–9. 
 234. See id. at 9. 
 235. Id.
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chooses Option One, performs a study, and then decides to reject the proper-
ty as suitable.236  In this case, the seller-petitioners allegedly fraudulently 
misrepresented the property as wetland-free in their MLS advertisement, and 
the buyers relied on that advertisement in purchasing the property.237  In 
doing so, they failed to exercise the option that would have created a contrac-
tual duty.238  Whether intentional, or accidental, the petitioner, by including 
this clause—which clearly requires substantial interpretation—may have 
actually won the battle to include the fraud in the inducement claim within 
the scope of arbitration, but not in the manner originally designed.239
The second issue raised by the Jacksons is all about intent.240  Most of 
the discussion put forth by the petitioners surrounds the respondents’ know-
ledge.241  The petitioner claims that because the buyers are sophisticated 
within the area of real estate, and because they stated their intent to build on 
the property, then they clearly intended to arbitrate these types of claims.242
Unfortunately, this argument is faulty since intent and knowledge, though 
closely tied, are not analogous.243  Intent—in the vacuum of contract lega-
lese—can only be derived from the language contained within the four cor-
ners of the contract.244  It is defined as “[t]he state of mind accompanying an 
act, esp[ecially] a forbidden act.  While motive is the inducement to do some 
act, intent is the mental resolution or determination to do it.”245  On the other 
hand, knowledge is generally accepted as being earned through experience.246
The accepted legal definition of knowledge is “[a]n awareness or understand-
ing of a fact or circumstance; a state of mind in which a person has no sub-
stantial doubt about the existence of a fact.”247  The petitioner correctly and 
thoroughly explains that the broad nature of the arbitration provision within 
 236. See id. at 8–9. 
 237. Id. at 8; Complaint, supra note 17, at 3–4. 
 238. See Petitioners’ Initial Brief on the Merits, supra note 30, at 8–9.  Remember, mere 
reference to the contract does not necessarily create the contractual nexus.  See Seifert v. U.S. 
Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 638 (Fla. 1999). 
 239. See Petitioners’ Initial Brief on the Merits, supra note 30, at 8–10. 
 240. Id. at 12–13. 
 241. Id. at 13. 
 242. Id. at 10, 13. 
243. Compare BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 881 (9th ed. 2009) (defining intent), with id. at 
950 (defining knowledge). 
 244. See Cavendish, supra note 26, at 20.  In several opinions, judges have written that 
depending on the language of the contract, intent can also be inferred from the conduct of the 
parties.  See, e.g., Rosenhaus v. Star Sports, Inc., 929 So. 2d 40, 42–43 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 
2006). 
 245. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 881 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis added). 
 246. See id. at 950–51. 
 247. Id. at 950. 
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the contract clearly indicates the intent to include a tort for fraud in the in-
ducement as within its scope.248  The remaining question for the court to de-
cide is whether the remainder of the contract continues this reasoning or lim-
its the intent of the parties.249
Additionally, what the petitioner should have argued here, but only do 
so impliedly, is that the facts underlying the complaint for fraud in the in-
ducement are the same facts, which would support a breach of contract 
claim.  Therefore, the court should follow the reasoning of the Fifth District 
Court of Appeal in Maguire.
D. The Respondents’ Arguments 
The respondent also raises the same two issues, but in the negative; thus, 
the fraud claim bears no significant relationship to the contract and the clear 
intent of the parties is to exclude these types of claims from arbitration.250
The first argument addressed by the respondent centers on a lengthy dis-
cussion of the complaint.251  This is because Florida law requires the court to 
look at the allegations set forth in the complaint to determine whether the 
dispute arises from or relates to the subject of the contract.252  Out of more 
than twenty paragraphs, the contract in question is only mentioned thrice.253
As set forth above, the only reference to the Contract relate to the 
fact that it exists, the price paid, and the prayer for attorney’s fees.  
Shakespeare and Herd’s common-law fraud claim does not require 
reference to or construction of the Contract for its resolution, nor 
does it invoke any contractual provision.254
Therefore this shows that the contract slightly touches the complaint but does 
not bear a significant relation.255  Next, Shakespeare and Herd go through the 
entire process of proving fraud in the inducement without relation to the con-
tract.256  However, this argument is subject to criticism because a buyer find-
 248. See Petitioners’ Initial Brief on the Merits, supra note 30, at 12; see also Maguire v. 
King, 917 So. 2d 263, 266 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 
750 So. 2d 633, 640–41 (Fla. 1999)). 
 249. See Petitioners’ Initial Brief on the Merits, supra note 30, at 12. 
 250. Respondents’ Answer Brief on the Merits, supra note 17, at 11, 22. 
 251. Id. at 12; see also Complaint, supra note 17, at 3–6. 
 252. See Respondents’ Answer Brief on the Merits, supra note 17, at 13–14. 
 253. See id. at 17; see also Complaint, supra note 17, at 4, 6. 
 254. Respondents’ Answer Brief on the Merits, supra note 17, at 18. 
 255. See id.
 256. See id. at 18–20. 
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ing a property unsuitable—based on the Feasibility Study Period—springs 
forth particular contractual duties supported by the “Buyer Provision” dis-
cussed above.257  It is at this point the respondent should have pointed to the 
complaint, which does not allege the desire to return the property, but states 
that the harm inflicted by the Jacksons caused Shakespeare and Herd to miss 
a favorable housing market, thus losing profits and additional expenses on 
the property.258  This indicates that the relief sought is not based on the con-
tract, but in common law principles.259  This is important because an essential 
component of this conflict among the district courts is how the causes of 
action averred in pleadings relate to the contractual provision.260
The second issue argued by the respondent is related to the intent of the 
parties.261  The central theme of this argument is that because the contract 
failed to provide any remedy for the fraud allegations, it indicates that the 
intent of the parties was to exclude this from arbitration.262  The argument 
rests on the theory that the remedies provision of the contract limits the ex-
tent of the arbitration award, thus limiting the scope of claims subject to arbi-
tration.263
 The remedies provided in the Contract are: 
 (1) A remedy for the Buyer in the event the “Seller fails, re-
fuses or neglects to perform this Contract,” in which case the Buy-
er may choose to receive a return of the Buyer’s deposit without 
waiving the right to seek damages or to seek specific performance 
as per paragraph 14. 
 (2) A remedy for the Seller if the Buyer defaults, in which 
case the Seller may choose to retain and collect all deposits paid 
and agreed to be paid as liquidated damages or to seek specific 
performance as per paragraph 14. 
 257. See Petitioners’ Initial Brief on the Merits, supra note 30, at 9.  Shakespeare in fact 
did undertake a feasibility study of the parcel of land upon which this dispute is grounded.
See Complaint, supra note 17, at 5. 
 258. See Jackson I, 61 So. 3d 1194, 1197 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 74 So. 
3d 1083 (Fla. 2011); see also Respondents’ Amended Brief on Jurisdiction, supra note 170, at 
2; Complaint, supra note 17, at 5–6. 
 259. Jackson I, 61 So. 3d at 1198. 
 260. Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 636–37 (Fla. 1999) (citing Mediterra-
nean Enters., Inc. v. Ssangyong Corp., 708 F.2d 1458, 1464 (9th Cir.1983); In re Kinoshita & 
Co., 287 F.2d 951, 953 (2d Cir.1961)). 
 261. Respondents’ Answer Brief on the Merits, supra note 17, at 22. 
 262. Id. at 22, 24–25, 27. 
 263. See id. at 27. 
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 (3) A remedy in the event of disputes concerning entitlements 
to deposits, failing resolution through mediation, in which case the 
Escrow Agent may choose to elect to have the issue resolved by 
arbitration, a Florida Court, or the Florida Real Estate Commis-
sion. 
 (4) All other disputes, failing resolution in mediation, must be 
determined through mutual binding arbitration in the county where 
the Property is located, however, “the Arbitrator may not alter the 
contract terms or award any remedy not provided for in this Con-
tract.”264
However, this argument fails on two points.265  First, from the logical means-
ends analysis, one can point to the simple fact that the ends here of limiting 
awards to those provided for in the contract do not bear a rational relation-
ship to the means/causes of action.266  More likely, this provision is set forth 
in the contract as a necessary way to limit the liability of the parties in the 
event that either defaults.  The respondent does a notable job of reciting Flor-
ida constitutional law in an effort to rebut this argument.267  This brings us to 
the second point, whereby the right to redress can be limited by the parties to 
the contract, a point rightly asserted by the dissent in the court below.268  In 
fact, the court in Maguire dismissed the same exact argument.269  Moreover, 
award-limiting provisions are more accurately viewed as an analogue to 
guidelines or rules promulgated by the contracting parties for the arbitra-
tor.270
 264. Id. at 24. 
 265. See Jackson I, 61 So. 3d 1194, 1198–99 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 74 
So. 3d 1083 (Fla. 2011). 
 266. See id.; see also Respondents’ Answer Brief on the Merits, supra note 17, at 24. 
 267. Respondents’ Answer Brief on the Merits, supra note 17, at 26 (noting that a basic 
right in Florida requires that the courts remain open for redress of all injuries); see also FLA.
CONST. art I, § 21. 
 268. Jackson I, 61 So. 3d at 1202–03 (Marstiller, J., dissenting) (citing Kaplan v. Kimball 
Hill Homes Fla., Inc., 915 So. 2d 755, 761 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005)). 
 269. Maguire v. King, 917 So. 2d 263, 267 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005). 
 270. Id. (citing Pacificare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401, 405–07 & n.2 (2003); 
see Rollins, Inc. v. Lighthouse Bay Holdings, Ltd., 898 So. 2d 86, 88–89 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. 
App. 2005)). 
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IV. FALLOUT FROM THE DECISION
The discussion above reveals that regardless of which way the Supreme 
Court of Florida ultimately decides on the issues raised in Jackson, the future 
of arbitration provisions is a slippery slope.271
If the court sees fit to side with the arguments of the petitioner, it has 
the potential to exponentially expand the public policy in Florida to the point 
where almost all tort claims even remotely connected to a contract will be 
subject to arbitration provisions within any contract between the litigants. 272
Agreeing with the petitioner would almost assuredly create precedent such 
that arbitration provisions containing “any and all dispute” language would 
be construed so broadly that only those disputes clearly unrelated to the con-
tract could be litigated.273
Conversely, if the court agrees with the respondent’s arguments stating 
how the claim can be resolved without reference or interpretation of the con-
tract,274 the potential fallout could change how future lawyers draft arbitra-
tion provisions.  Future drafters would surely react by carefully crafting con-
tract language that is simultaneously more descriptive yet remains vague—
for example, “this arbitration provision contemplates torts, contractual provi-
sions, employment, and all other disputes which may arise from this con-
tract.”  The blowback from this type of language means that courts will ulti-
 271. See discussion infra Part III.D. 
 272. Compare Jackson I, 61 So. 3d at 1198, with Maguire, 917 So. 2d at 266–67; see also
Petitioners’ Initial Brief on the Merits, supra note 30, at 12. 
 273. See Jackson I, 61 So. 3d at 1198; Petitioners’ Initial Brief on the Merits, supra note 
30, at 12.  For example, assume Buyer and Seller enter into a real estate agreement to con-
struct and furnish a single-family home in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, which goes off without a 
hitch.  This real estate agreement includes an arbitration provision, which assuming arguendo,
is broad within Florida law.  Sadly, ten years later Buyer is severely beaten by Seller because 
Buyer slept with Seller’s wife, Desi.  Now, Buyer wants to bring a civil suit for battery against 
Seller.  It would seem that the two events bear no relation and Buyer can litigate his claim.  
However, what if we learn that Desi is short for Designer, and the entire genesis of the affair 
between Buyer and Designer began a decade earlier when Designer and Buyer worked togeth-
er to furnish the home, a duty imposed upon Designer only because of the real estate contract?  
If the Florida courts continue on the path outlined above, it is plausible that Buyer’s battery 
claim against Seller would be precluded from going to court because the past contract required 
that the claim be arbitrated.  See Maguire, 917 So. 2d at 266.  Furthermore, it is disheartening 
to ponder a legal climate where the gravamen of a decision can swing on such minutiae. 
 274. Respondents’ Answer Brief on the Merits, supra note 17, at 18 (quoting Petitioners’ 
Initial Brief on the Merits, supra note 30, at 8). 
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mately be forced to construct or interpret contracts for the sheer fact of their 
complexity.275
The result, as this author sees it, is the emergence of a new judicial 
rule—that ultimately courts will be forced to create a new test based in equi-
ty and focused more on the intent of the parties as discerned through the lan-
guage chosen and their actions.276  In other words, the test would force the 
courts to ask, “was it foreseeable that this dispute would arise and litigation 
would occur?”  If the answer is yes, then the claim must be compelled to 
arbitration.  Conversely, if the answer is no, this is an unforeseeable cause of 
action.  Unforeseeable claims shall remain within the jurisdiction of the 
courts.277
This test is essentially contractual intent distilled by traditional tort law, 
and for the purposes of this article, it will be known as the “Shakespeare 
Test.”278  The standard of review for the Shakespeare Test is that of an objec-
tively reasonable person in the same circumstances as the party seeking to 
enforce the arbitration clauses.279  The reason that a test based on foreseeabil-
 275. See Jackson I, 61 So. 3d at 1199 (citing HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, 
S.A., 685 So. 2d 1238, 1239–40 (Fla. 1996)). 
 276. See id. at 1201, 1204 (Marstiller, J., dissenting). 
 277. This test would not be unlike the current foreseeability test of proximate causation 
used in common-law negligence analyses.  See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 
101 (N.Y. 1928); see also McCain v. Fla. Power Corp., 593 So. 2d 500, 502 (Fla. 1992).  This 
test would establish a limitation on arbitration with respect to the scope of broad arbitration 
clauses applied to torts.  Palsgraf established the concept of proximate cause, which uses 
foreseeability to limit the liability in negligence cases to repercussions of an action which 
could reasonably been foreseen as opposed to every action which follows the negligent act.  
See Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 101.  Currently, Florida uses a test which is similar to the “but for” 
test in torts.  See Seifert v. U. S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 638 (Fla. 1999).  However, with 
regard to arbitration agreements, it is almost certain that but for the contract these two parties 
would not have an issue in dispute.  Therefore, one who seeks arbitration and is fortuitous
enough to have an injury in tort which a judge, in his discretion, sees as significantly related
or having a sufficient nexus to the contract—itself a perversion of “but for” applied to arbitra-
tion clauses—will be able to compel arbitration.  See id.  Sadly, if the judge does not find, in 
his opinion, a “but for” relationship, then the dispute will not be subject to arbitration.  See id.
Therefore, to avoid this, the author proposes that for a tort issue to be subject to a broad arbi-
tration clause, it must be the type of dispute which reasonable contracting parties in a similar 
situation would contemplate as a result of this contract or a breach of the same. 
 278. See Jackson I, 61 So. 3d at 1197–98 (citing Seifert, 750 So. 2d at 636). 
 279. See D'Alemberte v. Anderson, 349 So. 2d 164, 168 (Fla. 1977) (explaining the rea-
sonably prudent person standard).  One could also listen in on the first week of any torts class 
at any law school within the state of Florida to learn about the reasonably prudent person 
standard. 
The reasonable person is an ideal of a model citizen, but will have shortcomings as deter-
mined appropriate by the fact finder. 
 However, the reasonable person may act differently in different situations.  The fact 
finder must determine what a reasonable person would do “under the same or similar cir-
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ity280 is the best test to determine whether a particular claim is subject to arbi-
tration, is because it falls directly in line with contractual intent.281  When 
discussing the intent of the parties within the bounds of contract law, courts 
have repeatedly fallen back upon the essence of intent as an objective meet-
ing of the minds.282  Obviously then, whenever a court is determining the 
intent of the parties as to the breadth of an arbitration clause, the judges are 
implicitly asking themselves:  “What did these two parties want to be cov-
ered by this arbitration clause in this contract?”283  It is at this point that logi-
cal consideration must be given to what that question means.  It means that at 
some point, prior to signing the contract, the parties must have realized that 
certain types of disputes are the plausible result of the contract they intend to 
sign, and that those claims are too expensive, or present too much liability, or 
any myriad of other reasons parties prefer to avoid litigation.  The simple 
point is that these parties contemplated and foresaw various disputes they 
would prefer to arbitrate, rather than litigate; and it is these disputes which 
are within the scope of the arbitration clause found within the agreement 
between the parties. 
V. CONCLUSION
Due to the confusing nature of the test currently used in Florida, it is 
difficult for contracting parties to know at the outset what future disputes are 
cumstances” as the defendant.  Although the reasonable person standard of conduct is clearly 
determined by taking account of the facts of each situation, the reasonable person standard is, 
minus narrow exceptions, an objective standard in regards to the actor.  The idiosyncrasies of 
individuals are not taken into account when determining whether an actor is liable for damag-
es. 
Kristin Harlow, Note, Applying the Reasonable Person Standard to Psychosis:  How Tort Law 
Unfairly Burdens Adults with Mental Illness, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1733, 1738 (2007) (emphasis 
added) (footnotes omitted). 
 280. See McCain, 593 So. 2d at 502 (discussing foreseeability under Florida common law 
with regard to proximate causation).  In this respect, proximate cause is concerned with if and 
to what magnitude the defendant’s conduct foreseeably and substantially caused the particular 
injury in dispute.  Id.
 281. See Cavendish, supra note 26, at 20. 
 282. See Robbie v. City of Miami, 469 So. 2d 1384, 1385 (Fla. 1985) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Data Lease Fin. Corp., 302 So. 2d 404, 407 
(Fla. 1974)) (stating that mutual assent refers not to both parties having the same subjective 
intent but to both parties having  the same understanding of the essential terms of a contract). 
 283. See Seifert, 750 So. 2d at 636 (citing Tracer Research Corp. v. Nat’l Envtl. Servs. 
Co., 42 F.3d 1292, 1294 (9th Cir. 1994); Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Trailer Train Co., 
690 F.2d 1343, 1352 (11th Cir. 1982); Miller v. Roberts, 682 So. 2d 691, 692 (Fla. 5th Dist. 
Ct. App 1996); Regency Grp., Inc. v. McDaniels, 647 So. 2d 192, 193 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 
1994) (per curiam)). 
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potentially subject to arbitration.284  The split of authority amongst the dis-
trict courts of Florida results in a failure of uniform jurisprudence, leaving 
potential contractors without the capacity to determine their ability to redress 
foreseeable future torts via litigation when considering agreements contain-
ing arbitration provisions.285  Though courts have seen fit to manipulate the 
Seifert test under their discretion to decide conflicts, this test ultimately 
proves to be more confusing than workable, owing mostly to its highly dis-
cretionary nature.286  The judges and lawyers overseeing these cases are assu-
redly highly intelligent, and therefore always able to reach a conclusion.  
However, it is disturbing that two cases with analogous facts could reach 
opposite results.287  Therefore, the Supreme Court of Florida should take this 
opportunity to streamline the process of determining whether tort claims, 
which tenuously touch commercial contracts, are subject to arbitration. 
 284. See Seifert, 750 So. 2d at 636–37; Hanzman, supra note 68, at 22–23; The Scope of 
Arbitration Clauses in Florida, supra note 39. 
 285. See supra Parts II.A, III. 
 286. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 287. See Jackson I, 61 So. 3d 1194, 1197 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 74 So. 
3d 1083 (Fla. 2011); see also Maguire v. King, 917 So. 2d 263, 264–65, 268 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. 
App. 2005). 
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